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SECOND-ORDER PERFECTIONISM
Cass R. Sunstein*
I. THAYERVILLE, BERGERTON, AND OTHER PLACES

No approach to constitutional interpretation makes sense in every
possible world. The argument for any particular approach must depend, in
1
part, on a set of judgments about institutional capacities.
Consider the view, associated with James Bradley Thayer, that courts
should uphold legislation unless it is plainly in violation of the
Constitution. 2 Few people accept this position today. But imagine a
society-let us call it Thayerville-in which democratic processes work
exceedingly fairly and well, so that judicial intervention is almost never
required from the standpoint of anything that really matters. In Thayerville,
racial segregation does not occur; political speech is not banned; the
legitimate claims of religious minorities and property holders are respected;
and the systems of federalism and separation of powers are safeguarded,
precisely to the right extent, by democratic institutions. Imagine too that in
Thayerville, judicial judgments are highly unreliable. For example, judges
make systematic blunders, from the standpoint of political morality, when
they attempt to give content to constitutional terms such as "equal
protection of the laws" and "due process of law." In such a society, a
Thayerian approach to the Constitution would make a great deal of sense,
3
and judges should be persuaded to adopt it.
Or consider originalism: the view that the Constitution should be
construed to fit with the original public meaning of the document. 4 Imagine
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of
Political Science, University of Chicago. This essay was originally prepared for a
symposium at Fordham Law School entitled Minimalism Versus Perfectionism in
Constitutional Theory Participants in that Symposium provided valuable help. I am also
grateful to Abner Greene and Brian Leiter for excellent comments on a previous draft.
1. An illuminating and vigorous argument to this effect can be found in Adrian
Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty (2006).
2. See generally James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
ConstitutionalLaw, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893).
3. I put to one side the evident fact that Thayerism is not a complete account of
constitutional interpretation. We might agree that courts should strike down statutes only
when the violation of the Constitution is clear, but how do we know when the violation is
clear? To work, Thayerism needs to be supplemented by some kind of account of
constitutional meaning.
4. See generally Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the
Law (1997).
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a society-let us call it Bergerton 5-in which the original public meaning is
quite excellent, in the sense that it ensures well-functioning institutions and
protects a robust set of rights. Imagine that in Bergerton, the democratic
process is also very fair and good, in part because of the excellence of the
Constitution, and that it is entirely able to make up for any inadequacies in
the founding document.
Suppose finally that in Bergerton, judges,
unleashed from the original public meaning, would do a great deal of harm,
unsettling those well-functioning institutions and recognizing, as rights,
interests that do not deserve that recognition. In such a society, an
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation would seem best.
Or consider minimalism: the view that judges should take narrow,
theoretically unambitious steps, at least when they lack the experience or
the information to rule broadly or ambitiously. 6 Imagine a society-it
happens to be called Smallville-in which the original public meaning of
the Constitution is not so excellent, in the sense that it does not adequately
protect rights. Imagine that in Smallville, the democratic process is good
but not great, in the sense that it sometimes produces or permits significant
injustices. Suppose finally that in Smallville, judges will do poorly if they
strike out on their own, but very well if they build modestly on their own
precedents, following something like the common law method. In such a
society, a minimalist approach to the Constitution would be quite
7
attractive.
Or consider perfectionism: the view that the Constitution should be
construed in a way that makes it best, and in that sense perfects it.8 Imagine
a society-proudly called Olympus-in which the original public meaning
of the document does not adequately protect rights, properly understood.
Imagine that the text is general enough to be read to provide that protection.
Imagine finally that Olympian courts, loosened from Thayerian strictures,
or from the original understanding, or from minimalism, would generate a
far better account of rights and institutions, creating the preconditions for
both democracy and autonomy. In Olympus, a perfectionist approach to the
9
Constitution would seem to be entirely appropriate.
Is any one of these approaches ruled out by the Constitution itself? If the
founding document set out the rules for its own interpretation, judges would

5. See generally Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary:

The Transformation of the

Fourteenth Amendment (1977). Berger is concerned with original intentions, rather than
original meaning, but for present purposes we can put that disagreement to one side as a
"within-the-family" issue in Bergerton.
6. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the
Supreme Court (1999).
7. Of course, there are many different kinds of minimalism; to say that courts should
take small, incompletely theorized steps is not to say where they should go. For further
discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 353 (2006).
8. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986); James E. Fleming, Securing
Constitutional Democracy: The Case of Autonomy (2006).
9. I put to one side potential conflicts between Olympian practices and democratic selfgovernment on the ground that by hypothesis Olympian judges create no such conflicts.
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be bound by those rules (though any such rules would themselves need to
be construed). But the document sets out no such rules. It does not say that
judges, or others attempting to interpret the document, should be
Thayerians, originalists, minimalists, perfectionists, or anything else. For
this reason, any approach to the document must be defended by reference to
some account that is supplied by the interpreter. The Constitution is rightly
taken as binding, but, to this extent, the Constitution must be made rather
than found.
It is possible to go further. Any approach to the founding document must
be perfectionist in the sense that it attempts to make the document as good
as it can possibly be. Thayerism is a form of perfectionism; it claims to
improve the constitutional order. Originalism, read most sympathetically,
is a form of perfectionism; it suggests that constitutional democracy,
properly understood, is best constructed through originalism. Minimalism
the
is a form of perfectionism too. It rejects Thayerism and originalism on
1 0 It
ground that they would make the constitutional system much worse.
would appear that the debate among Thayerians, originalists, minimalists,
and perfectionists must be waged on the perfectionists' own turf. If this is
so, perfectionists are right to insist that any approach to the Constitution
Perhaps the alternatives to
must attempt to fit and to justify it.
perfectionism are all, in some sense, perfectionist too.
Some people might resist this conclusion. Pragmatists might not care
very much about "fit"; on one view, consequences are what matter, and a
forward-looking approach, compromising fit for the sake of good
Perhaps Thayerians and
consequences, might well be justified."1
For some originalists,
originalists would compromise fit as well.
illegitimate precedents, departing from the original understanding, have
little standing. 12 But if we understand perfectionism with sufficient
capaciousness, its critics are actually practitioners too. Sensible pragmatists
care deeply about fit, if only for pragmatic reasons; an approach to the
Constitution that jettisons precedents, or that pays no attention to the
document itself, would be difficult to defend on pragmatic grounds. Many
originalists do care about fit with precedents. 13 Those who do not, or who
are willing to reject precedents that they deem illegitimate, certainly care
about fit-but what matters is fit with the original understanding, not with
the decisions that departed from it.
The ideas of "fit" and "justification" leave many ambiguities. "Fit" with
what? "Justified" by reference to what? If we understand the two ideas
broadly enough, all reasonable views about constitutional interpretation are
perfectionist in character. Even those who emphasize occasional or
frequent unhappy endings to constitutional adjudication, in the form of
10. For an elaboration, see Cass R. Sunstein, Radicals in Robes: Why Extreme RightWing Courts Are Wrong for America (2005).
11. See generally Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2003).
12. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 26 (discussing Justice Clarence Thomas's views).
13. See id. (discussing Justice Antonin Scalia's views).
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judicial decisions that produce particular results that they abhor, believe that
the ultimate ending is good rather than bad, in the sense that it produces
more in the way of self-government, or legitimacy, or other important
values.
My basic goal in this essay is to sketch the argument for second-order
perfectionism-aform of perfectionism that is alert to institutional limits on
the part of those who are entrusted with interpreting the founding
document. Because of my focus on institutional capacities, I shall be
focusing throughout on constitutional interpretation by the judiciary. From
the discussion of Thayerville, Bergerton, and their surrounding
communities, it should be clear that there is no reason that citizens and their
representatives should be required to adopt the same method that judges
favor. 14 On the view that I shall be defending, it is fully possible that
citizens will adopt first-order perfectionism, while judges will settle on a
second-order variety. We might believe, for example, that citizens should
interpret the Constitution to require states to permit same-sex marriage, or
to ban affirmative action, or to provide broad protection of property rights,
without thinking that judges should interpret the Constitution the same way.
Of course, it is also possible that citizens do not need constitutional ideals
or constitutional text to pursue their preferred views. Perhaps their own
ideals will do the trick.
II. ON

THE VERY IDEA OF INTERPRETATION

Does the idea of interpretation, standing by itself, require acceptance of
any particular approach to the Constitution? Some people believe so. 1 5 To
understand second-order perfectionism and the alternatives, it is necessary
to address this question.
A. Meaning and Intentions
Perhaps some form of originalism is mandated by the very notion of
interpretation. 16 In ordinary life, we interpret words by asking about the
speaker's original intentions. If a friend asks you to meet her at "the best
Chinese restaurant in town," you will probably ask what, exactly, she had in
mind. You will not ask which Chinese restaurant you like best, or which
Chinese restaurant your favorite restaurant critic prefers. Perhaps legal
interpretation is not fundamentally different; perhaps some form of
originalism is built into the concept of interpretation.
This idea is tempting but mistaken. When a speaker's intentions are what
matter, it is for pragmatic reasons, not because of anything inherent in
14. The idea of constitutional interpretation outside of courts is explored from various

angles in Fleming, supra note 8, and Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993).
15. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left- Wing
Law Professors Are Wrong for America, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 2207 (2006) (reviewing
Sunstein, supra note 10)).
16. Id. at 2226-32.
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interpretation as a social practice. We ask about the speaker's intentions
because, and to the extent that, the goal of communication will go badly, or
at least less well, if we do not. When a friend asks me to meet her or to do
something for her, I am likely to ask about her intentions because I want to
meet her or to do what she would like.
Or consider communication within some hierarchical organization: If a
supervisor tells an employee what to do, it is plausible to think that in
ordinary circumstances the employee ought to ask, "What, exactly, did my
supervisor mean by that?"' 17 The employee asks this question, if he does,
for pragmatic reasons. Employees should generally follow the instructions
of their supervisors, and the practice of following instructions, in
hierarchical organizations, usually calls for close attention to subjective
intentions.
But it is easy to think of cases in which interpretation does not operate by
reference to the speaker's intentions. In fact, the most sophisticated
originalists contend that what matters is the original public meaning, not
intentions at all. 18 They defend their interest in the original public meaning,
as opposed to the original intentions, on the plausible ground that public
meaning is objective, not subjective, and that what matters is the standard
understanding among the Constitution's ratifiers, not what any authors
"intended."
After all, the ratifiers, and not the authors, turned the
Constitution into law. Of course, those who make this claim insist on
originalism, but they do not care about subjective intentions. My point is
not to say that the original meaning should be taken as binding. It is only to
say that this understanding of originalism-as involving public meaning
rather than intentions-should be enough to show that attention to
subjective intentions is hardly built into the very idea of interpretation.
In fact, many of those who emphasize the original meaning tend not to
argue that their approach is what interpretation necessarily is, but to adopt a
form of second-order perfectionism. 19 They stress the risks associated with
judicial discretion; they focus on the goal of democratic self-government.
Consider the illuminating suggestion by Randy Barnett, a committed
originalist: "Given a sufficiently good constitutional text, originalists
maintain that better results will be reached overall if government officialsincluding judges-must stick to the original meaning rather than
'20
empowering them to trump that meaning with one that they prefer.
Many originalists contend that their preferred approach justifies the
Constitution and, of course, fits with it. Prominent originalists also want to

17. The qualification "in ordinary circumstances" is necessary because even
subordinates will sometimes ask about something other than speaker's intentions.
Everything depends on the role of the subordinate.
18. See Scalia, supra note 4, at 129-49.
19. See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849

(1989).
20. Posting of Randy Barnett to
cie05O5.msp (May 2, 2005, 13:43 EST).

http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub-
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show that their approach fits not only with the document but also with a
great deal of existing doctrine, or at least with those aspects of it that seem
least dispensable. 2 1 The point is that those who stress original meaning do
not contend that their approach is built into the very idea of interpretation.
To be sure, that idea does impose constraints; not everything can be
counted as "interpretation." Even if it is pragmatically best to substitute the
best Constitution for our own, the substitution cannot qualify as
interpretation. But the idea of interpretation does not compel any form of
originalism. Indeed, it is perfectly conventional to find domains in which
interpretation occurs without the slightest reference to either original
intentions or original meaning.
Suppose that the U.S. Supreme Court is interpreting a precedent-for
example, its decision in Lawrence v. Texas. 22 The Court is most unlikely to
ask about the subjective intentions of Justice Anthony Kennedy, the author
of the majority opinion,2 3 and it is equally unlikely to inquire into the
subjective intentions of those who joined the opinion. Perhaps there is no
such intention with respect to the question at hand; perhaps it is not
accessible even if it exists. In any case, the Court shows no interest in it.
Nor will the Court pay attention to the original public meaning of its
decision (whatever that might mean!). Interpretation of a precedent has
little to do with original intentions or original meaning.
The appropriate conclusion is that originalism is one approach to
interpretation, but it is merely one. The question is whether it is the right
one. That question requires attention not to the concept of interpretation but
to the consequences of the recommended approach-to whether it would
make our constitutional order better or worse.
B. Fit and Justification
Evidently building on judicial approaches to precedents, Ronald Dworkin
suggests that interpretation requires an effort both to fit and to justify the
existing legal materials. 24 The requirement of fit calls for fidelity to the
material that is being interpreted. The requirement of justification means
that when more than one possibility fits, the judge must bring forward what
seems to be the best principle that accounts for the existing materials.
Dworkin believes that the ideas of fit and justification-captured in his
notion of "integrity"-help explain the nature of interpretation in many
domains. 2 5 Dworkin may even believe that, as a social practice,
interpretation is a search for integrity in his sense. Strongly influenced by
Dworkin, James Fleming offers a similar understanding in his illuminating
21. See Akhil Reed Amar, Rethinking Originalism: OriginalIntentfor Liberals (andfor
Slate,
Sept.
21,
2005,
and
Moderates,
Too),
Conservatives
http://www.slate.com/id/2126680/.
22. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
23. Id. at 561.
24. See generally Dworkin, supra note 8.
25. See id.
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and impressive book on constitutional interpretation. 26 I shall turn to
Fleming's particular arguments shortly; for the moment, let us consider the
ideas of fit and justification in connection with first-order and second-order
perfectionism.
Suppose that a nation-say, Iraq-has ratified a constitutional provision
that forbids any denial of "equality under the law on the basis of sex."
Suppose that the government adopts a height and weight requirement for its
security forces and that the requirement turns out to have a disproportionate
adverse effect on women. Suppose, finally, that if the government is forced
to justify the height and weight requirement on grounds of job-relatedness,
it will not find it easy to do so. If the requirement is challenged as a denial
of "equality under the law," what should a court in Iraq do?
On Dworkin's view, the Iraqi court must give a "moral reading" to the
constitutional provision, in the sense that the court should generate the best
moral principle that accounts for it. 27 Offhand, we might imagine a reading
that restricts the clause to facial discrimination (call this the
"antidiscrimination" principle); we might also imagine a reading that calls
on government to justify itself in convincing terms whenever it has imposed
a distinctive burden on women (call this the "anticaste" principle).
Dworkin's characteristic style is to identify at least two opposing principles
and to suggest that because one is better, the Iraqi court ought to choose
it. 28 But consider another possibility. The court might prefer the anticaste
principle as a matter of abstract theory, believing that it makes better sense
of the guarantee of equality under the law. But at the same time, the court
might select the antidiscrimination principle, on the ground that it ensures
that judges will not be forced to undertake inquiries for which they are illsuited.
The court might believe that judgments about whether a
requirement is sufficiently job-related are extremely burdensome; it might
also believe that if judges attempt to make such judgments, they will often
blunder. In this respect, judges might conclude that the equality guarantee
is properly under-enforced by the judiciary; they might adopt the
antidiscrimination principle for that reason.
If courts reason in this way, are they attempting both to fit and to justify
our legal practices? In one sense, the answer is clear-they are. But even
in this mundane example, their perfectionism is second-order, not firstorder. They are refusing to adopt the morally preferred account of equality,
simply because of a sense of their own fallibility. 29 Second-order
perfectionism, with respect to an equality guarantee, can hardly be ruled out
of bounds.
26. See Fleming, supra note 8, at 210-27.
27. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the
American Constitution (1996).
28. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, in A Matter of
Principle 316 (1985).
29. Fleming, unlike Dworkin, agrees that some constitutional protections are underenforced by the judiciary, and rightly so. See Fleming, supra note 8, at 215.
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Now imagine that the government has argued not only that the
antidiscrimination account is the better one, but also that the court should
uphold sex discrimination so long as it is minimally rational. For the
equality guarantee, the government argues that the court should proceed as
it would in Thayerville. In my view, that would be an unfortunate reading
of an equality guarantee, because it would undermine that guarantee so
severely, and because most nations, including contemporary Iraq, are not
Thayerville. But in the end, that view must also be sensitive to institutional
capacities, and it must be defended with close reference to them. Suppose
that judges deciding sex equality cases would produce worse-than-random
decisions. If so, we may be in Thayerville, and perhaps the rational basis
test would be desirable after all.
To be a bit more systematic: An approach to the Constitution might
impose two kinds of costs. It might impose decision costs, and it might
impose error costs. Without making the ludicrous claim that these ideas
should be understood in purely economic terms, we can insist that judges do
well to consider the decisional burdens of one or another approach to the
founding document. Those burdens or costs might be faced by judges or by
others, including legislators, members of the executive branch, and citizens
themselves, who must pay the cost of uncertainty. A Thayerian approach to
the Constitution would certainly impose low decision costs. But it is also
important to consider the number and the magnitude of errors. If judges
uphold sex discrimination whenever it is rational, they would, in my view,
permit a large number of serious errors. It is for this reason that in the
United States, the rational basis test would make no sense in the domain of
sex discrimination. We may be in Smallville or we may be in Olympus, but
we are certainly not in Bergerton or Thayerville.
The broader point is that no approach to interpretation is dictated by the
very idea of interpretation. Originalism is certainly a candidate; it cannot
be rejected on a priori grounds. The problem with originalism is that it
would make the American system of constitutional law much worse than it
is now. 30 While the question is closer, the same is true for Thayerism.
Whatever one's judgment about the particulars, some form of perfectionism
is inevitable. It is important to fit our practices; it is also important to make
sense of them. 3 1 But in my view, minimalism, as a form of second-order
perfectionism, is far better than the first-order variety.
III. DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATIVE AUTONOMY

To understand these various claims, and the limits of first-order
perfectionism, I now turn to the instructive recent discussion by James

30. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 54-78.
31. In so saying, I am not endorsing Dworkin's particular understanding of fit and
justification, nor am I denying the possibility that fit should be emphasized for purely
pragmatic reasons.
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Fleming. 32 Fleming offers a careful and sustained account of what, in his
view, constitutional perfectionism requires. One of the many virtues of his
book is the unabashed quality of his version of perfectionism. As he
understands the Constitution, it does in fact guarantee "happy endings," and
there is nothing wrong with that fact.33 If our goal is to fit and to justify our
practices, why should we settle for unhappy endings? The second-order
perfectionist has an answer, but that answer ensures that the ending is not
quite unhappy, despite some bad bumps along the way. The first-order
perfectionist seeks to avoid the bumps.
Designed under the evident influence of John Rawls, Fleming's form of
perfectionism is emphatically first-order. He believes that courts should
protect deliberative democracy by securing its preconditions, which entail
both reflection and accountability. More controversially, Fleming believes
that courts should safeguard deliberative autonomy by protecting a robust
right of self-determination. The latter right is "underwrit[ten]" by liberty of
conscience and freedom of association, though it is not limited to them. 34 A
more general claim is that we should attempt "to give full meaning to our
constitution of principle, a covenant of aspirations and ideals that guarantee
the promise of liberty and that must survive more ages than one." 35 As a
way of investigating this form of perfectionism, I focus on Fleming's
claims on behalf of deliberative autonomy, exploring deliberative
36
democracy largely by way of comparison.
A. DeliberativeAutonomy
As Fleming describes it, the idea of deliberative autonomy does not
require libertarianism in the form of a full-scale attack on the regulatory
state; indeed, it "does not justify special judicial protection of economic
liberties." 37 But it does protect a wide range of individual rights, including
the right of gays and lesbians to engage in intimate association, evidently on
the ground that heterosexual intimate association receives similar
protection. 38 More generally, deliberative autonomy calls for liberty of
conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of association, including both
expressive association and intimate association, whatever one's sexual
orientation; the right to live with one's family, whether nuclear or extended;
the right to travel or relocate; the right to marry; the right to decide whether
to bear or beget children, including the rights to procreate, to use
32. See Fleming, supra note 8.
33. Id. at 210-15.

34. Id. at 106.
35. Id. at 126-27.
36. Sunstein, supra note 10, emphasizes an approach to the Constitution rooted in
deliberative democracy. I do not exactly repudiate the approach there, but I believe that the
discussion would have been better if it had grappled with the theory-building limitations of
the federal judiciary, and explored whether and to what extent a minimalist approach to
interpretation might, in the end, fit with one rooted in the ideal of deliberative democracy.
37. Fleming, supra note 8, at 135.
38. Id. at 137.
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contraceptives, and to terminate a pregnancy; the right to direct the
education and rearing of children; and the right to exercise dominion over
one's body, including the right to bodily integrity and ultimately the right to
39
die.
To evaluate Fleming's proposal, we need to ask at the outset: What is the
textual source of deliberative autonomy? The First Amendment provides
an evident textual foundation for "liberty of conscience and freedom of
thought, '40 and also for "freedom of association, ' 4 1 at least of certain
kinds. 4 2 Insofar as people are attempting to speak on political questions or
to associate for political purposes, their rights seem constitutionally secure
or at least plausible as a textual matter. If a theoretically ambitious account
is required, the idea of deliberative democracy, which certainly has
historical roots in the founding period, 43 is enough; we need not speak of
autonomy at all.
Protection of some forms of speech may, however, be difficult to defend
by reference to deliberative democracy alone. Nonpolitical literature, for
example, might be best understood by reference to deliberative autonomy
rather than deliberative democracy; here, existing understandings of free
speech certainly fit with Fleming's concerns. The text of the First
Amendment refers to "freedom of speech," not "freedom of political
speech," and hence an idea of autonomy, with respect to speech, is not
44
textually out of bounds.
But let us put speech to one side. Insofar as Fleming stresses autonomy
rights outside the domain of the First Amendment, most of his catalogue of
rights must be defended by reference to the Due Process Clause, not the
First Amendment. 4 5 It should be unnecessary to emphasize that it is a large
textual stretch to use the Due Process Clause to protect deliberative
autonomy because the Clause speaks in terms of process alone. 46 The
textual awkwardness of "substantive due process" casts a large and dark
shadow over ambitious efforts to protect autonomy in general.
Notwithstanding this problem, it is true that some form of substantive due
process is an established part of existing law,4 7 and so long as existing law

39. Id. at 11.
40. Id.

41. Id.
42. See U.S. Const. amend. I.
43. See generally Joseph M. Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason:

Deliberative

Democracy and American National Government (1994).
44. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (1993)
(defending a two-tiered conception of free speech, placing political speech in a preferred
position).
45. I put to one side the question of whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause
provides a more secure home for autonomy rights. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
46. See id. ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States .... ").
47. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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is accepted, the textual stretch might not be taken as a decisive objection to
Fleming's proposal.
But it is easy to imagine two kinds of challenges to that proposal, based
on first-order and second-order perfectionism respectively. My major
concern is the latter. I spend some time on the former not to show that
Fleming is wrong on first-order grounds, but to pave the way toward a
second-order alternative.
B. Internal Challenges
The first-order challenge could take various forms. Fleming purports to
48
build directly on established law-to defend it far more than to revise it.
But suppose that we seek deliberative autonomy as such. If so, it is most
unlikely that we would single out for special protection the particular set of
interests that Fleming has catalogued. Most of those interests would be
strong candidates for inclusion, but the list would be much longer, and it is
doubtful that all of those mentioned by Fleming would come near the top.
Fleming, of course, is not unaware of this point, but I think it raises serious
questions about his proposal.
If deliberative autonomy is involved, Fleming's catalogue seems both
over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Some sex acts are not simple to
understand in terms of "deliberative" autonomy; some such acts are
impulsive, not deliberative. Does Fleming mean to exclude one-night
stands, or one-afternoon stands, or a one-shot visit to a prostitute from the
ambit of his proposal? If not, deliberation might not be at the heart of his
claims after all. More fundamentally, his list of protected interests seems
far too narrow, at least if we focus on the ideal of deliberative autonomy.
Imagine that people want to ride motorcycles without wearing helmets or
drive cars without wearing seatbelts; that they would like to use heroin,
marijuana, cocaine, or LSD; that they seek a medical treatment
unauthorized by the Food and Drug Administration; that they would like to
work more hours than is permitted by the Fair Labor Standards Act; that
they would like to be prostitutes or drug dealers; or that they would like to
clone themselves or their children. Or imagine that people would like to
have a chance to enter some profession. Perhaps they would like to be debt
adjusters, even without a law degree. 49 Perhaps they would like to be
interior designers, and the government is standing in their way with a
restriction that is evidently arbitrary or at least weakly justified.50

48. See Fleming, supranote 8, at 89-140.
49. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (holding that a Kansas law requiring
debt adjusters to have law degrees did not offend constitutional principles of equal
protection).
50. See Institute for Justice, Economic Liberty Cases: New Mexico Interior Design,
http://www.ij.org/economicjliberty/nmjinteriordesign/index.html (last visited Mar. 30,
2007) (discussing a challenge to the New Mexico law that prohibits people from calling
themselves "interior designers" without a government license).
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To be sure, it is possible that third-party effects provide a sufficient
answer to some of these claims. Perhaps the interest in autonomy is
overridden because of the effects of free choices on those who are affected
by them. But such effects are most unlikely to provide an adequate answer
in all or even many of these cases. We might well conclude that people
who assert these rights-and many others-are deliberating about and
attempting to implement their own conception of the good. Does Fleming
51
seek to protect them as well? If not, an explanation must be offered. If
so, the idea of deliberative autonomy might well seem to have
(unacceptably?) radical implications. To be sure, Fleming builds on
existing doctrine and attempts to rationalize it. But might it not be a
problem if the rationalization would lead, possibly or certainly, to many
results that the Court is unprepared to reach, and that it probably should
decline to reach?
It would not be unreasonable to fear that the Constitution would be made
worse, not better, with the judicial protection of deliberative autonomy as
such. Suppose, for example, that protection of the right to physicianassisted suicide would lead many people to choose death, not after
sufficiently considered reflection, but as a result of intense, short-term fears
and anxieties. If so, there is a plausible argument that such a right should
not exist, because it is not in the interest of the very people on behalf of
whose autonomy it is created. 52 Even if this argument is rejected, it
remains possible that, if the right is created, it will operate in practice to
give doctors, not patients, the authority to make decisions about life and
death. 53 If this empirical prediction turns out to be correct, there are serious
problems, from the perfectionist point of view, with creating the right to
physician-assisted suicide.
This example could easily be generalized. Many decisions that people
make as part of what they might well consider to be their deliberative
autonomy turn out not to promote, but instead to undermine, their own
well-being. 54 Bounded rationality is often the problem. A detailed
literature investigates failures in "affective forecasting," as when people
51. Fleming does contend that his approach does not require a general libertarian
principle. Fleming, supra note 8, at 134-37. But there is certainly an overlap between the
two approaches, and I am not sure that he has successfully separated them. He urges that
paternalistic laws, of the sort disfavored by libertarians, "typically do not implicate the
concerns of the antitotalitarian principle of liberty or infringe on significant basic liberties."
Id. at 136. But why not?
52. See generally Herbert Hendin, Seduced By Death: Doctors, Patients, and Assisted
Suicide (1998).
53. See id. at 215-28 (discussing who should decide for patients in a coma or diagnosed
with dementia).
54. See generally Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems
in the ForecastingofFutureAffective States, in Feeling and Thinking: The Role of Affect in
Social Cognition 178 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000) [hereinafter Gilbert & Wilson,
Miswanting]; Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting,35 Advances
Experimental Soc. Psychol. 345 (2003) [hereinafter Wilson & Gilbert, Affective
Forecasting].

2007]

SECOND-ORDER PERFECTIONISM

2879

misjudge the effects of their decisions on their own lives. 55 Constitutional
protection of decisions produced by "miswanting," 56 in the form of choices
that do not improve people's welfare, would not seem to be in the interest
of the people whose decisions are at stake.
Perhaps autonomy, rather than welfare, should be our lodestar; Fleming
appears to think so. 57 But this is a controversial view within political
philosophy, and even if autonomy is our guiding principle, it is unclear that
governments must respect decisions produced by bounded rationality.
Fleming believes that the Constitution protects the right to marry.5 8 But
what, exactly, does this mean? On one account of deliberative autonomy,
adults should be permitted to marry their cousins, siblings, or perhaps their
parents, or to have multiple spouses. Is the right to polygamy guaranteed
by the right to deliberative autonomy? On perfectionist grounds, it would
be possible to worry that any such right would turn out to harm the interests
of some or many people-including, perhaps, many women and children.
Perhaps Fleming would conclude that the right to marry is properly limited
to two adults, and that the ban on incestuous marriages is consistent with
the basic principle, properly conceived. But if the underlying concern is
deliberative autonomy, why, exactly, is this limitation justified?
I do not contend that the ideal of deliberative autonomy has no roots in
constitutional traditions. Nor do I deny that as a matter of principle,
Fleming's account of autonomy has considerable appeal. In Olympus, a
judge might well accept an account of that general kind. The question is
whether the interest in deliberative autonomy, as Fleming understands it,
might have far broader implications than indicated by Fleming's catalogue
of protected rights. Fortunately, Fleming does not offer a "top down"
account of constitutional doctrine; his own catalogue is largely anchored on
settled law5 9-a point to which I will return. But as compared to settled
law, the idea of deliberative autonomy has a great deal of generality and
ambition; and it might end up leading to outcomes that would make the
Constitution less perfect, not more so.
C. External Challenges: Second-OrderPerfectionism
I raise these points not to settle them, but to emphasize a different kind of
objection. Suppose that we believe that federal judges are poorly equipped
to set out the ingredients of autonomy, deliberative or otherwise. Suppose
that we believe that they are likely to blunder-that if they ask about the
nature of autonomy in the abstract, they will protect interests that ought not
to be protected, and refuse to protect interests that emphatically deserve
protection. Some people might fear, for example, that judges are likely to

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting,supra note 54, at 345-46.
See Gilbert & Wilson, Miswanting,supra note 54.
See Fleming, supra note 8, at 3.
Id.at 11.
Id. at 92.

2880

FORDHAMLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 75

find commercial advertising to be central to autonomy, rightly conceived,
or that they will provide undue protection to campaign contributions, or that
they will strike down minimum wage and maximum hour legislation. (If
this catalogue does not seem especially fearful, it would be easy to produce
a catalogue that would.) No one should be surprised by the suggestion that
if judges are unleashed to strike down legislation by reference to the idea of
"deliberative autonomy," they might well blunder.
Outside of Olympus, there is no guarantee that real-world judges, trained
and fallible as they are, will be able to execute Fleming's project in a way
that Fleming or anyone else would approve. If we are concerned about the
costs of decisions and the costs of error, in any imaginable form, first-order
perfectionism, founded on high ideals, loses some of its appeal, at least as
60
an enterprise for judges.
Recall here the suggestion that originalism might produce the best overall
consequences. 6 1 To evaluate that suggestion, we need to know something
about institutions; we also have to know something about political morality.
Suppose that originalism, rightly understood, would greatly limit the
powers of the national government, eliminate the right of privacy,
strengthen the protection of property holders and gun owners, and allow the
national and state governments to discriminate on the basis of sex. (I do not
contend that originalism necessarily would have these consequences.) If so,
is the argument for originalism strengthened or weakened? That question
cannot be answered without asking whether and to what extent the relevant
results are good or bad. We can therefore see that disputes about
interpretive approaches have a great deal to do not only with institutional
capacities, but also with moral evaluations of the relevant results. A central
objection to originalism is that it would produce morally unacceptable
outcomes. The same objection could plausibly be made against Thayerism
as well. I believe Fleming's (and Dworkin's) approach would greatly strain
judicial capacities, and that, in some cases, it would produce results that are
questionable from the moral point of view.
Let me offer a simple suggestion in this light. As Fleming shows, our
constitutional doctrine is now committed to certain forms of autonomy.
Whether these are deliberative forms, and whether they are best understood
by reference to a broader right to exercise one's capacities for a conception
of the good, might be debated. But there is no question that in specified
domains, government may not intrude on people's choices without an
exceedingly strong justification. In Smallville, judges value stability and
distrust their own capacity to rethink established law from the ground up.
Hence, they are convinced that they should build on these decisions through
rulings that are both narrow and theoretically unambitious (to the extent

60. Of course Fleming is not focused solely on judges, and my objections here do not go
to his proposals for constitutional interpretation outside of the judiciary.
61. See Posting of Randy Barnett, supra note 20.
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possible 62 ). Because the abstraction of "deliberative autonomy" is so
difficult to handle, the judges of Smallville do not want to march under its
banner. They fear that an abstraction of that kind will lead to undue
confusion and error. Because they are not too sure that they are right, they
proceed by reference to low-level
principles that seem at once more
63
manageable and less contentious.
Here is another way to illustrate the point: Heavily influenced by John
Rawls, Fleming wants to secure the conditions for free and equal
citizenship. 64 Rawls's own approach to political philosophy seeks to put to
one side the great questions in metaphysics and general philosophy in a way
that "leaves philosophy as it is." 6 5 The goal of political liberalism, as
opposed to comprehensive liberalism, is to bracket foundational disputes
about human nature, the good, and the like, and to seek general
commitments on which diverse people can converge from their different
starting points. Minimalists are sympathetic to this goal, but they attempt to
go one step further. They seek incompletely theorized agreementsparticular judgments and low-level rationales that people can accept
notwithstanding their disagreements or uncertainties about foundational
questions. 66 In short, minimalists want to leave political philosophy as it
is-to put to one side, whenever possible, 67 controversies over the right
form of liberalism, or even between liberalism and its adversaries.
For minimalists, the problem with the ideal of deliberative autonomy is
that it extends far beyond the decided cases and requires judges to ask
questions that they are not well-suited to answer. Minimalists do not reject
that ideal, but they are not prepared to endorse it. Their commitment to
second-order perfectionism prevents them from doing so on the ground that
endorsement of such an ideal threatens to make constitutional law worse
rather than better.
CONCLUSION

In this essay I have tried to suggest the appeal of second-order
perfectionism-an approach to constitutional interpretation that recognizes
the limitations of the federal judiciary, especially in the domain of political
and moral reasoning. We should be willing to agree that, in some sense,
interpreters of the document have duties of both fit and justification. Where

62. Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (2006), rightly insists that judges might have to
think fairly ambitiously to resolve hard cases.
63. For this reason, Edward H. Levi's An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, with its
emphasis on "reasoning by example," continues to offer useful guidance about legal
reasoning in the constitutional domain. Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning
1(1949).
64. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 8, at 14.
65. See John Rawls, Reply to Habermas,92 J.Phil. 132, 134 (1995).
66. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996).
67. But see Dworkin, supra note 62 (emphasizing the need for conceptual ascent in some
cases).
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the requirement of fit leaves several possibilities, judges have to think about
what approach would be best. Judgments of political morality are in that
sense an indispensable part of any view about how to interpret the
Constitution. The arguments for and against originalism, and for and
against Thayerism, must pay considerable attention to the results that they
would generate, and hence, those with different evaluative positions will
offer different judgments about those results. If originalism and Thayerism
would permit racial segregation or sex discrimination, how strongly,
exactly, does that fact count against the two approaches?
If the goal is to perfect the Constitution, neither originalism nor
Thayerism can easily be ruled out of bounds, at least if we attend to the
fallibility of judges; both can be understood as forms of second-order
perfectionism. In some possible worlds, originalism is best; Thayerism is
best in others. Minimalist approaches also embody a form of second-order
perfectionism. And if all this is right, it remains possible to argue that firstorder perfectionism makes sense for political participants and their
representatives, even if judges should be more firmly constrained.
On its face, the idea of a "moral reading" of the Constitution is
ambiguous. That idea could call for case-by-case judgments about what
68
morality requires, constrained by the existing legal materials.
Alternatively, it could accommodate an approach, itself justified on grounds
of political morality, that forbids or sharply disciplines those judgments.
Certainly it cannot be shown, by reference to the abstract ideas of fit and
justification, that second-order perfectionism is inferior to first-order
varieties. On the contrary, it is not obviously false to say that a form of
minimalism, at least in the most difficult cases, fits our practices and also
justifies them.
The ideal of deliberative democracy can be specified in different ways,
and if we believe that judges are unlikely to make sensible specifications,
we might be skeptical about the suggestion that the Constitution should be
construed in light of that ideal. In my view, however, American judges
tend to do well, at least in hard cases, when they approach the
69
Constitution's general phrases with reference to deliberative democracy.
The question of institutional capacity is different when judges attempt to
give content to the ideal of "autonomy," even if we disregard the apparently
procedural character of the Due Process Clause. To be sure, the ideal of
autonomy is not undisciplined in the domain of speech and religion, where
it can be cabined by reference to both settled law and widely shared
intuitions. But for "liberty" in general, reasonable people can and do
disagree, more than vigorously, about what autonomy ought to entail. For
judges, an effort to protect autonomy, or deliberative autonomy, would

68. This seems to me the direction indicated by Dworkin, supra note 27.
69. Justice Stephen Breyer makes an argument to this general effect. See generally

Stephen Breyer, Active Liberty: Interpreting Our Democratic Constitution (2006).
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impose serious decisional burdens, and in the end it is not at all clear that
American democracy would be better as a result.
With respect to autonomy, I suggest that judges do best, if they can, to
build narrowly from previous rulings, in a way that avoids theoretical
abstractions. Of course it is true that in hard cases a degree of theoretical
ambition will become inevitable. It is also true that a number of decisions
now protect autonomy of one or another sort, and current controversies
must pay close attention to those decisions. But where there is no problem
from the standpoint of self-government, and no unjustifiable inequality, I
believe that judges should usually give democratic processes the benefit of
the reasonable doubt. However that may be, the largest point remains: Any
approach to constitutional interpretation must pay close attention to the
problem of judicial fallibility, and for that reason, second-order
perfectionism has great appeal.

Notes & Observations

